Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department: a theoretical analysis of low-price collusion in SBIC
Abstract We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China (SIBC) from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors (LIIs), small and medium-sized institutional investors (SMIIs), and supervi...
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Prif Awduron: | , |
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| Fformat: | Artigo |
| Iaith: | Inglês |
| Cyhoeddwyd: |
SpringerOpen
2023-01-01
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| Cyfres: | Financial Innovation |
| Pynciau: | |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-022-00413-x |
| Tagiau: |
Dim Tagiau, Byddwch y cyntaf i dagio'r cofnod hwn!
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