Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department: a theoretical analysis of low-price collusion in SBIC
Abstract We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China (SIBC) from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors (LIIs), small and medium-sized institutional investors (SMIIs), and supervi...
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| Główni autorzy: | , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Język: | Inglês |
| Wydane: |
SpringerOpen
2023-01-01
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| Seria: | Financial Innovation |
| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-022-00413-x |
| Etykiety: |
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