Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department: a theoretical analysis of low-price collusion in SBIC
Abstract We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China (SIBC) from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors (LIIs), small and medium-sized institutional investors (SMIIs), and supervi...
Gardado en:
| Principais autores: | , |
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| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado: |
SpringerOpen
2023-01-01
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| Series: | Financial Innovation |
| Assuntos: | |
| Acceso en liña: | https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-022-00413-x |
| Tags: |
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