Can Government Incentive and Penalty Mechanisms Effectively Mitigate Tacit Collusion in Platform Algorithmic Operations?

Algorithmic collusion essentially constitutes a form of monopolistic agreement that utilizes algorithms as tools for signaling collusion, making it particularly challenging for both consumers and antitrust enforcement agencies to detect. Algorithmic collusion can be primarily categorized into two di...

Popoln opis

Bibliografske podrobnosti

Principais autores:	Yanan Wang, Yaodong Zhou
Format:	Artigo
Jezik:	Inglês
Izdano:	MDPI AG 2025-04-01
Serija:	Systems
Teme:	algorithmic tacit collusion incentive–penalty mechanisms evolutionary game simulation analysis
Online dostop:	https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/4/293
Oznake:	Označite Brez oznak, prvi označite!