Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, coll...
保存先:
| 出版年: | Estudios de Economía |
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| 主要な著者: | , |
| フォーマット: | Artigo |
| 言語: | Inglês |
| 出版事項: |
Universidad de Chile
2013
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22129674006 |
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