Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, coll...
Gorde:
| Argitaratua izan da: | Estudios de Economía |
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| Egile Nagusiak: | , |
| Formatua: | Artigo |
| Hizkuntza: | Inglês |
| Argitaratua: |
Universidad de Chile
2013
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| Gaiak: | |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22129674006 |
| Etiketak: |
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