Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, coll...
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| Pubblicato in: | Estudios de Economía |
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| Autori principali: | , |
| Natura: | Artigo |
| Lingua: | Inglês |
| Pubblicazione: |
Universidad de Chile
2013
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=22129674006 |
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