Moral asymmetries in judgments of agency withstand ludicrous causal deviance

People attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the t...

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Principais autores:	Paulo eSousa, Colin eHolbrook, Lauren eSwiney
Formato:	Artigo
Idioma:	Inglês
Publicado:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2015-09-01
Series:	Frontiers in Psychology
Assuntos:	action intentional action Moral judgments Blame Credit causal deviance
Acceso en liña:	http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01380/full
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