Moral asymmetries in judgments of agency withstand ludicrous causal deviance
People attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the t...
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| Hlavní autoři: | , , |
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| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2015-09-01
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| Edice: | Frontiers in Psychology |
| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01380/full |
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