Moral asymmetries in judgments of agency withstand ludicrous causal deviance
People attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the t...
Gorde:
| Egile Nagusiak: | , , |
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| Formatua: | Artigo |
| Hizkuntza: | Inglês |
| Argitaratua: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2015-09-01
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| Saila: | Frontiers in Psychology |
| Gaiak: | |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01380/full |
| Etiketak: |
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