METAETHICS FOR EVERYONE
As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s str...
Na minha lista:
| Publicado no: | Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado em: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2010
|
| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002002 |
| Tags: |
Sem tags, seja o primeiro a adicionar uma tag!
|