METAETHICS FOR EVERYONE
As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s str...
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| Wydane w: | Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho |
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| 1. autor: | |
| Format: | Artigo |
| Język: | Inglês |
| Wydane: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2010
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940002002 |
| Etykiety: |
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