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Ex-ante moral hazard: empirical evidence for private health insurance in Brazil
This paper explores the existence of ex-ante moral hazard in private health insurance in Brazil. Before the advent of illness, insured individuals have no incentives to seek preventive care if it is not previously contractible. The data set comprises longitudinal administrative records of health car...
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Publicado en: | Nova Economia |
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Autores principales: | , , |
Formato: | Artigo |
Lenguaje: | Inglês |
Publicado: |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=400465621011 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/400465621011.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/movil |
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