Cargando...

Ex-ante moral hazard: empirical evidence for private health insurance in Brazil

This paper explores the existence of ex-ante moral hazard in private health insurance in Brazil. Before the advent of illness, insured individuals have no incentives to seek preventive care if it is not previously contractible. The data set comprises longitudinal administrative records of health car...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Nova Economia
Autores principales: Ana Carolina Maia, Mônica Viegas Andrade, Flávia Chein
Formato: Artigo
Lenguaje:Inglês
Publicado: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais 2019
Materias:
Ex
Acceso en línea:https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=400465621011
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/html/
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/400465621011.epub
https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4004/400465621011/movil
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!