When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people an...
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| Publicado en: | THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia |
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| Principais autores: | , |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado: |
Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2007
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acceso en liña: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802004 |
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