When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough

Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people an...

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Bibliografiske detaljer
Udgivet i:THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia
Main Authors: Hilan BENSUSAN, Manuel DE PINEDO
Format: Artigo
Sprog:Inglês
Udgivet: Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea 2007
Fag:
Filosofía
self
knowledge
Richard Moran
Moore’s paradox
Online adgang:https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730802004
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