On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion
We analyze how the size of a cartel affects the possibility to sustain a collusive agreement. We develop a multi-period oligopoly model with homogeneous, quantity-setting firms, a subset of which are assumed to collude, while the remaining (fringe) firms choose their output levels noncooperatively....
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| Publicado en: | Investigaciones Económicas |
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| Autor Principal: | |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado: |
Fundación SEPI
2008
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acceso en liña: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17332303 |
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