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The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example
The aim of this paper is to present a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) which is not susceptible to the Frankfurt-style counter-example. I argue that PAP does not need to be endorsed as a necessary condition for moral responsibility and, in fact, presenting PAP as a sufficien...
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| Vydáno v: | Philosophia (Ramat Gan) |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
Springer Netherlands
2016
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6099989/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30158728 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9690-2 |
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