Young, G. (2016). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example. Philosophia (Ramat Gan).
Citação norma ChicagoYoung, Garry. "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities As Sufficient but Not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A Way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example." Philosophia (Ramat Gan) 2016.
Citação norma MLAYoung, Garry. "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities As Sufficient but Not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A Way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example." Philosophia (Ramat Gan) 2016.
Nota: a formatação da citação pode não corresponder 100% ao definido pela respectiva norma.