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Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language

The “costly signaling” hypothesis proposes that animal signals are kept honest by appropriate signal costs. We show that to the contrary, signal cost is unnecessary for honest signaling even when interests conflict. We illustrate this principle by constructing examples of cost-free signaling equilib...

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Autores principales: Lachmann, Michael, Számadó, Szabolcs, Bergstrom, Carl T.
Formato: Artigo
Lenguaje:Inglês
Publicado: The National Academy of Sciences 2001
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Acceso en línea:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC60846/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11687618
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.231216498
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