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Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games.
Much of the literature on costly signalling theory concentrates on separating equilibria of continuous signalling games. At such equilibria, every signaller sends a distinct signal, and signal receivers are able to exactly infer the signaller's condition from the signal sent. In this paper, we...
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| Главные авторы: | , , |
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| Формат: | Artigo |
| Язык: | Inglês |
| Опубликовано: |
2002
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693066/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12495516 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2002.1068 |
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