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When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game
BACKGROUND: The reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication. Both empirical work and theoretical models show that communication need not be entirely honest, and thus signals can be deceitful. Aggressive communication appears to be a prime candidate for such deceitful c...
保存先:
| 出版年: | BMC Evol Biol |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Artigo |
| 言語: | Inglês |
| 出版事項: |
BioMed Central
2017
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5745956/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29281957 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12862-017-1112-y |
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