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A simple rule for the evolution of contingent cooperation in large groups
Humans cooperate in large groups of unrelated individuals, and many authors have argued that such cooperation is sustained by contingent reward and punishment. However, such sanctioning systems can also stabilize a wide range of behaviours, including mutually deleterious behaviours. Moreover, it is...
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| Publicado en: | Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2016
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acceso en liña: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4760199/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26729938 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0099 |
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