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A simple rule for the evolution of contingent cooperation in large groups
Humans cooperate in large groups of unrelated individuals, and many authors have argued that such cooperation is sustained by contingent reward and punishment. However, such sanctioning systems can also stabilize a wide range of behaviours, including mutually deleterious behaviours. Moreover, it is...
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| Vydáno v: | Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci |
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| Hlavní autoři: | , |
| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
The Royal Society
2016
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4760199/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26729938 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0099 |
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