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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, indi...
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| Publicado no: | Rev Econ Stat |
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado em: |
2015
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4710379/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26769985 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00518 |
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