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Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Priso...

詳細記述

保存先:
書誌詳細
主要な著者: Wedekind, C, Milinski, M
フォーマット: Artigo
言語:Inglês
出版事項: 1996
主題:
オンライン・アクセス:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC39691/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11607644
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