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Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails

The standard model for direct reciprocity is the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, where in each round players choose between cooperation and defection. Here we extend the standard framework to include costly punishment. Now players have a choice between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. We s...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Main Authors: Rand, David G., Ohtsuki, Hisashi, Nowak, Martin A.
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Publicado em: 2008
Assuntos:
Acesso em linha:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2614626/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18938180
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015
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