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Why not lie? Costs enforce honesty in an experimental signalling game
Communication depends on reliability. Yet, the existence of stable honest signalling presents an evolutionary puzzle. Why should animals signal honestly in the face of a conflict of interest? While students of animal signalling have offered several theoretical answers to this puzzle, the most widely...
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | , |
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| Μορφή: | Artigo |
| Γλώσσα: | Inglês |
| Έκδοση: |
The Royal Society
2014
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| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3843836/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24225460 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.2457 |
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