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Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons
From group hunting to global warming, how to deal with collective action may be formulated in terms of a public goods game of cooperation. In most cases, contributions depend on the risk of future losses. Here, we introduce an evolutionary dynamics approach to a broad class of cooperation problems i...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Sprog: | Inglês |
| Udgivet: |
National Academy of Sciences
2011
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| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3127907/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21659631 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1015648108 |
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