Caricamento...
Evolution of cooperation with shared costs and benefits
The quest to determine how cooperation evolves can be based on evolutionary game theory, in spite of the fact that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for most non-zero-sum games are not cooperative. We analyse the evolution of cooperation for a family of evolutionary games involving shared costs...
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Artigo |
| Lingua: | Inglês |
| Pubblicazione: |
The Royal Society
2008
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2596366/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18495622 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2007.1685 |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne! !
|