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Evolution of cooperation with shared costs and benefits
The quest to determine how cooperation evolves can be based on evolutionary game theory, in spite of the fact that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for most non-zero-sum games are not cooperative. We analyse the evolution of cooperation for a family of evolutionary games involving shared costs...
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| Autors principals: | , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicat: |
The Royal Society
2008
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| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2596366/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18495622 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2007.1685 |
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