Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?
ABSTRACT John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some aut...
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| Formatua: | Artigo |
| Hizkuntza: | Inglês |
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UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
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| Saila: | Manuscrito |
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| Sarrera elektronikoa: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017005002101&lng=en&tlng=en |
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