Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth
Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompat...
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| Natura: | Artigo |
| Lingua: | Espanhol |
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Universidad de Murcia, Departamento de Filosofía
2023-05-01
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| Serie: | Daimon |
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| Accesso online: | https://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/480391 |
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