Promise‐Keeping Reputations in an Investment Game: An Experimental Investigation
ABSTRACT We design a controlled laboratory experiment to mitigate moral hazard problems in livestream shopping when sellers make promises to buyers. In our experiment, the promise‐keeping reputation mechanism allows sellers to send promises to buyers while buyers can observe the sellers' historical...
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| Autors principals: | , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicat: |
Wiley
2026-06-01
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| Col·lecció: | International Studies of Economics |
| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://doi.org/10.1002/ise3.70016 |
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