Promise‐Keeping Reputations in an Investment Game: An Experimental Investigation
ABSTRACT We design a controlled laboratory experiment to mitigate moral hazard problems in livestream shopping when sellers make promises to buyers. In our experiment, the promise‐keeping reputation mechanism allows sellers to send promises to buyers while buyers can observe the sellers' historical...
Na minha lista:
| Principais autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artigo |
| Sprog: | Inglês |
| Udgivet: |
Wiley
2026-06-01
|
| Serier: | International Studies of Economics |
| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | https://doi.org/10.1002/ise3.70016 |
| Tags: |
Ingen Tags, Vær først til at tagge denne postø!
|