Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies
The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentence ph...
שמור ב:
| מחבר ראשי: | |
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| פורמט: | Artigo |
| שפה: | Inglês |
| יצא לאור: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2017-11-01
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| סדרה: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| נושאים: | |
| גישה מקוונת: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/47922 |
| תגים: |
אין תגיות, היה/י הראשונ/ה לתייג את הרשומה!
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