Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies
The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentence ph...
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| Materialtyp: | Artigo |
| Språk: | Inglês |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2017-11-01
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| Serie: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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| Länkar: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/47922 |
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