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Optimal Incentives Schemes under <i>Homo Moralis</i> Preferences

This study focuses on the optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both being observable by the principal. In particular, the two agents display homo moralis preferences. I find that, con...

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Gorde:
Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egile nagusia: Roberto Sarkisian
Formatua: Artigo
Hizkuntza:Inglês
Argitaratua: MDPI AG 2021-03-01
Saila:Games
Gaiak:
Sarrera elektronikoa:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/1/28
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