Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents
This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the agents to...
保存先:
| 第一著者: | |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | Artigo |
| 言語: | Inglês |
| 出版事項: |
MDPI AG
2021-10-01
|
| シリーズ: | Games |
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/4/77 |
| タグ: |
タグなし, このレコードへの初めてのタグを付けませんか!
|