Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information
In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward...
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| Hlavní autoři: | , , |
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| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Edice: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| On-line přístup: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7587453 |
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