Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information
In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward...
Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artigo |
| Langue: | Inglês |
| Publié: |
Wiley
2020-01-01
|
| Collection: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Accès en ligne: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7587453 |
| Tags: |
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|