Dretske on Closure of Knowledge and Its Rereading in Justification Logic
The K axiom in the logic of knowledge expresses this epistemological approach that knowledge is closed under known implications. For Dretske, for two reasons, the closure of knowledge cannot be tautology: first, the knowledge operator does not penetrate into some of the logical implications of our b...
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Hōputu: | Artigo |
| Reo: | Persa |
| I whakaputaina: |
Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2020-09-01
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| Rangatū: | حکمت و فلسفه |
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_11987_f42dc6a4f40156e52d26edbd5aa54f6d.pdf |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
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