Dretske on Closure of Knowledge and Its Rereading in Justification Logic
The K axiom in the logic of knowledge expresses this epistemological approach that knowledge is closed under known implications. For Dretske, for two reasons, the closure of knowledge cannot be tautology: first, the knowledge operator does not penetrate into some of the logical implications of our b...
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Persa |
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Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2020-09-01
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| Col·lecció: | حکمت و فلسفه |
| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_11987_f42dc6a4f40156e52d26edbd5aa54f6d.pdf |
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