Evolution of Driver Strategies Under Platform-Led Incentives: A Stackelberg–Evolutionary Game Model with Large-Scale Ride-Hailing Data

Online ride-hailing platforms increasingly rely on differentiated incentive mechanisms to regulate driver participation and balance supply and demand. However, drivers’ adaptive responses to such incentives introduce dynamic feedback and uncertainty that static equilibrium models fail to capture. Th...

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Hlavní autoři:	Wenbo Su, Jingu Mou, Zhengfeng Huang, Yibing Wang, Hongzhao Dong, Manel Grifoll, Pengjun Zheng
Médium:	Artigo
Jazyk:	Inglês
Vydáno:	MDPI AG 2026-04-01
Edice:	Systems
Témata:	online ride-hailing differentiated incentives Stackelberg game evolutionary game driver behavior
On-line přístup:	https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/14/4/399
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