Evolution of Driver Strategies Under Platform-Led Incentives: A Stackelberg–Evolutionary Game Model with Large-Scale Ride-Hailing Data
Online ride-hailing platforms increasingly rely on differentiated incentive mechanisms to regulate driver participation and balance supply and demand. However, drivers’ adaptive responses to such incentives introduce dynamic feedback and uncertainty that static equilibrium models fail to capture. Th...
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| Autores principales: | , , , , , , |
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| Formato: | Artigo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglês |
| Publicado: |
MDPI AG
2026-04-01
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| Colección: | Systems |
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/14/4/399 |
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