Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer
We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round. Our analysis demonstrates that when the initial transfer is la...
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Jezik: | Inglês |
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MDPI AG
2023-09-01
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| Serija: | Games |
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| Online dostop: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/5/60 |
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