Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer
We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round. Our analysis demonstrates that when the initial transfer is la...
Uloženo v:
| Hlavní autor: | |
|---|---|
| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
MDPI AG
2023-09-01
|
| Edice: | Games |
| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/5/60 |
| Tagy: |
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
|