Evolutionary path from a prisoner’s dilemma to a harmony game via hawk–dove games
Abstract In most evolutionary matrix game models, the payoffs are assumed to be constant. Here, we develop a toy model of hunting in pairs in which interaction outcomes are determined not only by the behavioural strategy choice of the players but also a second, evolvable physical trait of them. We a...
保存先:
| 主要な著者: | , , |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | Artigo |
| 言語: | Inglês |
| 出版事項: |
Nature Portfolio
2026-04-01
|
| シリーズ: | Scientific Reports |
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-47565-9 |
| タグ: |
タグなし, このレコードへの初めてのタグを付けませんか!
|