Evolutionary path from a prisoner’s dilemma to a harmony game via hawk–dove games

Abstract In most evolutionary matrix game models, the payoffs are assumed to be constant. Here, we develop a toy model of hunting in pairs in which interaction outcomes are determined not only by the behavioural strategy choice of the players but also a second, evolvable physical trait of them. We a...

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Номзүйн дэлгэрэнгүй

Үндсэн зохиолчид:	Balázs Király, Tamás Varga, József Garay
Формат:	Artigo
Хэл сонгох:	Inglês
Хэвлэсэн:	Nature Portfolio 2026-04-01
Цуврал:	Scientific Reports
Нөхцлүүд:	Matrix game Trait evolution Payoff evolution Social dilemma Evolutionarily stable strategy transition
Онлайн хандалт:	https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-47565-9
Шошгууд:	Шошго нэмэх Шошго байхгүй, Энэхүү баримтыг шошголох эхний хүн болох!