Non-reflective consciousness and our moral duties to non-reflective animals
Many philosophers and scientists believe that animals can be conscious by virtue of possessing first-order perceptual representations, while having high-order representational capacities is not necessary for being conscious. In this paper I defend this view but argue that it reveals that there are t...
Shranjeno v:
| izdano v: | Revista de Filosofía Aurora |
|---|---|
| Glavni avtor: | |
| Format: | Artigo |
| Jezik: | Inglês |
| Izdano: |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná
2024
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| Teme: | |
| Online dostop: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=673377571033 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571033/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571033/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571033/673377571033.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/6733/673377571033/movil |
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