Central Bank Independence: A Rigged Debate based on false Politics and Economics
The case for central bank independence is built on an intellectual two-step. Step one argues there is a problem of inflation prone government. Step two argues independence is the solution to that problem. This paper challenges that case and shows it is based on false politics and economics. The pape...
保存先:
| 出版年: | Investigación Económica |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Artigo |
| 言語: | Inglês |
| 出版事項: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2019
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=60171801005 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/601/60171801005/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/601/60171801005/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/601/60171801005/60171801005.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/601/60171801005/movil |
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